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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY North Korea

REPORT

SUBJECT The North Korean Air Force

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1. Introduction of MIG-19s by North Korean Air Force: The 60th Regiment, North Korean Air Force 1st Division, stationed at PUNCH'ANG, received a ground (theoretical) training course preparatory to equipment with MIG-19s at an unknown time. The course was completed prior to August 1960, and the report circulated among the North Korean pilots that the projected conversion will take place sometime in 1960. It was also talked about among the pilots that in view of certain defects in the performance of the MIG-19, equipment of MIG-21s was projected within this year.

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2. Foreign Personnel in North Korean Air Forces:

Five or six Russian advisors were assigned with the North Korean Air Command and an additional number was reported with the North Korean Defence Ministry. These advisors are mostly flying and technical specialists who frequently made inspections of the North Korean Air Force divisions. Early in the summer of 1949, [redacted] one (1) technical advisor at Wonsan Airfield, but since then, [redacted] none else. [redacted]

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[redacted] friendly and amicable relations exist between the Russian advisors and the North Korean Air Force.

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3. Morale of North Korean Air Force Personnel: Each defection of a North Korean pilot to the south was followed by a purge of those who were regarded ideologically unreliable. Even in ordinary times, political indoctrination of North Korean Air Force personnel is carried on intensively. As of 1960, most of the air force personnel were composed of "second generation" North Koreans who have received Communist indoctrination since childhood, and morale was considered generally high, at least on the surface. The North Korean pilots are confident of their superior fighting capability over their South Korean counterparts. They are apt to regard the South Korean Air Force pilots as unworthy of a serious reckoning, and they expect that their real opponents will be the American pilots.

4. All Aircraft in Possession of North Korean Air Force:

Type	Number	Unit
MIG-17PE	35	5 in each division except 5th Division
IL-28	approx 85	38th Bomber Regiment
IL-28L	7-8	24th Recon Regiment

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5. Salaries in North Korean Air Force:

a. Salaries: The pilots receive "adequate" salaries, but pay for ground personnel (including maintenance crews) are insufficient, forcing a maximum austerity upon them. Particularly for personnel with large families, shortage of food is posing a severe difficulty and other amenities are not even to be considered.

b. Food Rations:Families of PilotsFamilies of Ground Personnel

500 grams per capita per day

300 grams per capita per day

c. Food Supplies in North Korean Air Force:PilotsGround PersonnelSufficient
(meals furnished at any time)Side dishes unsatisfactory
(improvements, constantly
demanded, are never carried
out)

d. Working Conditions: There are no fixed working hours (normal duty hours are eight (8) hours daily). Usually, personnel are on duty from five to six a.m. until nine to ten p.m. with the exception of meal hours, the personnel are given free time of about 50 minutes (which must be devoted to mending of clothes, etc.). Most of the personnel are dissatisfied with the unusually large percentage of duty hours devoted to political "meetings". The same situation prevails in the Army and Navy.

e. Miscellaneous: Salaries and food supplies are better than for the Army or Navy, and especially the flying personnel are given the best treatment in the North Korean Armed Forces.

6. Sentiments Regarding the United States: Aged groups in the farm villages are the only exception to the predominant feeling of antagonism towards the U. S. and the Americans, probably due to the intensive anti-American propaganda infused for 15 years since liberation.

7. Existence of Nuclear Weapons in North Korea: The North Korean regime does not recognize the probability of a local war, and expects that any war involving North Korea in the future will be a global war. Therefore, the North Korean regime considers the possession of nuclear weapons in North Korea unnecessary (according to their propaganda), and such weapons are generally believed to be non-existent in North Korea.

8. CBR Training: No training in the use of chemical, biological or radiological weapons is made within the North Korean Armed Forces, but defense measures against these weapons are taught to North Korean personnel. Particularly, the air force personnel have received such training since January 1958. The training consisted of methods of aircraft and personnel dispersal and escape in case of nuclear attacks, and use of gas masks, and anti-contamination devices.

9. Instrumentation Bombing and Interceptions: IL-28 is the only type North Korean bomber equipped with instrumentation devices. MIG-17PE is the only

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fighter-interceptor in the North Korean Air Force.

a. Instrument Bombing by IL-28: The 36th Bomber Regiment, the only unit in possession of IL-28s, carried out instrument bombing training at an unknown site in Inner Mongolia. After moving to ULJU Airfield in North Korea, the unit carried out similar exercises at an unknown location in the vicinity of YUNGANG, P'YONGAN-HAMDO PROVINCE. Satisfactory results are said to have been obtained from these training exercises.

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b. Interception by MIG-17PK: When P-20 series radar intercepts invading aircraft, radio contacts are made to the airborne MIG-17PKs for interception direction. The MIG-17PK is equipped with a radar sight (consisting of a radar scope). When the image of enemy aircraft falls into the cross on the screen, cannon are fired within a range of 800 meters.

10. Interception Posture in Aerial Fighting: In case fuel runs out during an aerial fighting or in case the pilot is injured, the interceptors are allowed to return to base. But in other circumstances, each fighter must remain in formation even when ammunition is exhausted.

In case enemy aircraft are suspected of carrying out an attack with nuclear weapons, it is emphasized that it should be shot down at the first encounter by any and all means, including mid-air collision. (This method was "agreed" upon at a conference of fighter pilots discussing interception tactics.) This agreement is said to have been reached also in other divisions, including the 57th and 61st Regiments (Guard Regiments) of the 3rd Division.

11. Detection of Enemy Pursuit: Some MIG-15BIS and MIG-17s are equipped with special electronic devices at the end of the fuselage, which sound out a warning to the pilot when the pursuing enemy aircraft approaches within three (3) kilometers in the rear. The buzz increases in loudness as the enemy aircraft closes. The device is switched on in combat conditions.

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12. Organisation of North Korean Air Force is attached (Attachment #1).


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Combat Tactics of NKAF

1. Introduction of MIG-19s by NKAF:

The 60th Regt, NK 1st Div, stationed at Pukch'ang, received ground (theoretical) training course preparatory to equipment with MIG-19s at unk time. The course was completed prior to August 1960, and the report circulated among the NKAF pilots that the projected conversion will take place sometime in 1960. It was also talked about among the NKAF pilots that, in view of certain defects in the performance of the MIG-19, equipment of MIG-21s was projected within this year.

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2. Foreign personnel in NK (Air Force):

Subject never personally observed personnel of the CC Air Force in North Korea. Five (5) or six (6) Russian advisers were assigned with the NK Air Command and an additional number was reported with the NK Defense Ministry. These advisers are mostly flying and technical specialists, who frequently made inspections of the NKAF divisions. Early in the summer of 1949, [] one (1) technical adviser at the Wonsan A/[] but since then [] none else. []

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[] friendly and amicable relationships existed between the Russian advisers and NKAF personnel.

3. Morale of NKAF Personnel:

Each defection of NKAF pilots to the south was followed by a purge of those who were regarded ideologically unreliable. Even in ordinary times, political indoctrination of NKAF personnel is carried on intensively. As of 1960, most of the NKAF personnel were composed of "second generation" North Koreans who have received Communist indoctrination since childhood, and morale was generally considered high,

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as based on the surface. The NKAF pilots are confident of their superior fighting capability over their South Korean counterparts. They are apt to regard the South Korean AF pilots as unworthy of a serious reckoning, and they expect that their real opponents will be the American pilots.

4. AV A/C in possession of NKAF:

Model	Number	Unit
MIG-17 FG	15	5 in each division, except 5th Div.
MIG-21	approx 35	36th Bomber Regt.
MIG-21L	7-8	24th Rec Regt.

5. Salaries in NKAF:

a. Salaries:

The pilots receive "adequate" salaries, but payns for the ground personnel (including maintenance crew) are insufficient, forcing a maximum austerity upon them. Particularly for personnel with large families, shortage of food is posing a severe difficulty and other amenities are not even to be considered.

b. Food rations:

<u>Families of billets</u>	<u>Families of extra personnel</u>
700 grams per capita per day	500 grams per capita per day

c. Food supplies in NKAF:

<u>Billets</u>	<u>Ground personnel</u>
Sufficient (meals furnished at any time)	Side dishes unsatisfactory (improvements, constantly demanded, are never carried out.)

d. Working conditions:

There are no fixed norm of work hours (nocturnal duty hours 11/12 a.m. eight (8) hours daily). Usually, personnel are on duty from five (5) to six (6) A.M. until nine (9) to ten (10) P.M. with the exception of 11/12 hours, the personnel are given a free time of about 30 minutes (which must be devoted to washing of clothes, etc.). Not all the personnel are dissatisfied with the unusually large percentage of duty hours devoted to political "meetings." The same situation prevails in the navy and the Army.

e. Miscellaneous:

Salaries and food supplies are better than for the Army or the Navy, and especially the flying personnel are given the best treatment in the NK armed forces.

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6. Sentiments regarding the U.S.A.

Aged groups in the farm villages are the only exception to the predominant feeling of antagonism towards the U.S. and the Americans, probably due to the intensive anti-American propaganda infused for 15 years since liberation.

7. Existence of Nuclear Weapons in NK

The NK regime does not recognize the probability of a local war, and expects that any war involving NK is the future will be a global war. Therefore, the NK regime considers the possession of nuclear weapons in NK as unnecessary (according to their propaganda), and such weapons are generally believed to be non-existent in NK.

8. WRS trainings

No training in the use of chemical or biological weapons is made within the NK armed forces, but defense measures against these weapons are taught to NK personnel. Particularly the Air Force personnel have received such training since January 1954. This training consisted of methods of aircraft and personnel dispersal and escape in case of nuclear attack, and use of gas masks, and anti-contamination devices.

9. Attacks against Japan from NK Bases

Not applicable.

10. Instrumentation Bombing and Interceptions

Ilyushin IL-28 is the only type of NK Bomber equipped with instrumentation bombing devices. MiG-17 PF is the only fighter-interceptor in the KPAF.

a. Instrument bombing by IL-28

The 36th Bomber Regt, the only unit in possession of IL-28, carried out instrument bombing training at an unknown site in North Mongolia. After moving to the Hiju A/F in NK, the unit carried out similar exercises on a h/k location in the vicinity of Torgyuryg, P'yongan-Namdo Province. Satisfactory results are said to have been obtained from these training exercises, but subject was unable to furnish further information in this regard.

b. Interception by MiG-17 PF

When P-20 series of radar intercepts invading A/C, intercepts are made to the airborn MiG-17 PFs, for interception direction. The MiG-17 PF is equipped with a radar sight (consisting of a radar scope). When the image of enemy A/C

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fall into the cross on the screen, caution are fired within a range of 100 meters.

11. Interception posture in Aerial Fighting:

In case fuel runs out during an aerial fighting or in case the pilot is injured, the interceptors are allowed to return to base. But in other circumstances, each fighter must remain in formation even when the ammunitions are exhausted.

In case enemy A/C is suspected of carrying nuclear weapons, it is emphasized that it should be shot down at the first opportunity by any and all means, including a mid-air collision. (This method was "agreed" upon at a conference of fighter pilots discussing interception tactics). This agreement is said to have been reached also in other divisions including the 57th and 61st Regts ("guard regiments") of the 3rd Div..

12. Detection of Enemy Pursuit:

Some MIG-15 BISs and MIG-17s are equipped with special electronic devices at the end of the fuselage, which sound out a warning to the pilot when the pursuing enemy A/C approaches within three (3) kilometers in the rear. The buzz increases in loudness as the enemy A/C approaches nearer. The device is switched on in combat conditions. While the subject was not informed of the original designation of this device, he made frequent observations at the Wonsan A/F. A rough sketch is given below :

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Notes:

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- * Uncertainty whether signal regt, and radar-detection regt are independent or. The signal regt is called with a general designation of signal unit."
- * Uncertainty whether the Central warehouse is a subordinated echelon or not.
- * In 1956 (uncertain), after Hq. Air Defence was united with Hq. NK AF, two AAA units subordinated to the infantry unit came under the command of Hq. Air Defence, and in 1958, one division was disorganized and three AA gun Regts were re-organized.
- * During MAY-JUNE of 1959, 4th Interceptor Air Div. was re-organized and converted to 36th Bomber Regt under the direct command
- * Five-Six advisers of USSR officers (Plain cloth) are assigned to Hq. NKAF, and engaged in the flight/and engineer Depts as advisers.

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